Iraqi Dairy Factory Manager Sees Better Days AheadBy Army Sgt. David TurnerSpecial to American Forces Press Service FORWARD OPERATING BASE KALSU,

With his brother, Qahetan, managing the factory, Nu-Nu produces what Ahmed said is the best yogurt in

Locally made Iraqi products aren’t just a matter of pride with Ahmed. Imported products contain additives, he said, something he doesn’t need to do, since his products are shipped fresh and tested regularly. To demonstrate the quality, he opened a container of his yogurt and held it upside down, and the yogurt stayed inside. 

“You couldn’t do that with the imported stuff,” he said. “People in Basra and Nasariyah in the south or

The business, which currently employs about 175 people, used to employ nearly 300, but unsafe roads restricted fresh-milk deliveries from local farmers, reducing production. 

“We faced a hard situation when the insurgents and militias took over the neighborhoods here,” Ahmed recalled. “We faced a lot of problems, especially with the power.” 

The decline made room for cheaper, poorer-quality imported products in the marketplace. Unreliable power generation makes it difficult to keep machines working and products refrigerated. 

During a recent visit to Ahmed’s office, the lights went out twice. The two large generators, which provided most of the factory’s power, were so old and in such disrepair that they barely worked at all. 

Soldiers of 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, attached to the 3rd Infantry Division’s 4th Brigade Combat Team, learned of the factory’s problems during an assessment of businesses in the area. They tracked down two one-megawatt generators at the Iskandariyah Industrial Complex, which the large, state-owned company was willing to donate. 

With a pair of heavy-equipment transporters, 2-502nd Infantry Regiment soldiers delivered the generators to Nu-Nu factory Aug. 5. Though slightly used, the generators represented a huge savings to the factory; purchased new, the pair would have cost almost $1 million. 

“We discovered this was something they were lacking, and not only would it bring revenue and jobs, but it would also help the whole country as well,” said Army Capt. Robert Slubowski, executive officer of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2-502nd Infantry Regiment. 

The generator delivery is only half the battle, though. The generators require repairs and maintenance before they can take over the job of supplying the factory’s electricity needs. The biggest obstacle is obtaining the parts, which may cost as much as $40,000. Slubowski, from

“We were able to save them quite a bit, so we’re hoping with that money, they will be able to get the parts they need,” Slubowski said. 

Slubowski said that although Nu-Nu isn’t exactly a small business, the downturn in production and competition with cheaper imports has left the company in dire financial straits. 

“They’ve been running at a loss pretty much since [2003] because of low productivity, but they’ve been able to come through. I think a lot of that money is coming from their other businesses they run or personal money,” he said. “I think that says a lot about their character.” 

Qahetan said he considered other business opportunities in Canada and the United Arab Emirates, but he and his brother decided to stay in

“[Ahmed] strikes me as a good guy who genuinely cares about his product and is proud of what he does,” Slubowski said. “He wants people to want to buy his product, not because it is one of the only ones available, but because it’s the best.” 

During a recent visit, Ahmed gave Slubowski a tour of the factory, insisting that he sample each product. Ahmed also pointed out a new facility at the factory, where plans are in place to begin producing meat products. If they are successful, Ahmed hopes expansion will put the factory back on solid ground. The good reputation his products enjoy will be the key to that success, he said. 

(Army Sgt. David Turner serves in the 3rd Infantry Division’s 4th Brigade Combat Team’s Public Affairs Office.)

Samarra, Iraq — “You were an American soldier here in 2006?” asks Abu Saif.

“Yes,” I reply.

“Then you remember the Al Bazzi tribe,” he slyly posits. “We were one of the groups shooting at you,” he winks.

“Oh, yes, I remember,” I recall, now wearing my own grin. “And we shot back.”

He nods.

With that, we part ways — but not before memorializing the moment with a photo.

The guys would not believe this. The Abu Saif I met today — leader in the Samarra Rescue Council — is not the Abu Saif we knew in 2006. Same goes for Abu Faruk, Abu Anis, and others in the room. All were High-Value Targets just two years ago — men we tried our damnedest to kill or capture — and today they are our partners.

For a soldier, it’s tough to square this circle — as I’d rather have avowed enemies six-feet under than six-feet in front of me; especially those who may have killed or injured a brother-in-arms. But today — embedded with a new unit in Samarra — I can more easily forget the memory of old enemies than the present threat of enduring ones. The friends of my brothers are — I suppose — my friends, and I’m witnessing the awakening I thought possible in 2006.

The story of the Samarra Rescue Council (Samarra’s “Sahwa,” or Awakening Movement) is complex, with every aspect of its development deserving detailed explanation. Yet I am certain of two things after witnessing the “Sons of Samarra” (SOS) firsthand: One, they would not be in existence today were it not for the persistence and foresight of brave Americans; and two, they are the single most important factor in Samarra’s dramatic, and quite sudden, turnaround. The brilliant counterinsurgency strategy I wrote about yesterday serves primarily to support this indigenous movement.

Ironically, the realization that an awakening movement was necessary came via our enemies’ actions. Am Muhamed, the provincial representative for the Samarra Rescue Council (SRC), says “after years of violence, we finally realized that al-Qaeda was only here to destroy our city.” That same realization is personal for the SRC chief, Sheik Khalid. He has lost 19 members of his family at the hands of al-Qaeda (and the affiliated Al Badri tribe), including his wife and eldest son. Al-Qaeda itself laid the groundwork for Sahwa.

Today, 2,200 SOS are paid to secure Samarra’s streets — with another 1,100 working as unpaid volunteers outside the city. Six months ago there were zero. The patrols I shadowed this week couldn’t go two blocks without seeing AK-47-toting SOS members in fluorescent vests alongside Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Two years ago — and, I presume, six months ago — we could patrol for hours without seeing any Iraqi Police.

This cooperation between the SOS and both ISF and American forces — primarily “No Slack” Infantry battalion — is what makes the Samarra Sahwa movement work. Despite a great deal of initial resistance (heck, they were shooting at each other six months ago) the SOS work alongside formal ISF — Samarra police, national police, and the Iraqi army. They hold weekly coordination meetings, and even man joint checkpoints.

In most parts of Iraq, cooperation between so-called “Sunni militias” and conventional ISF is unheard of. In fact, Samarra’s top security officer — Major General Rasheed Al Hilfi — told me yesterday “the relationship between the SOS and ISF in Samarra is the best in all of Iraq.” This may be a stretch, but nonetheless, the predominately Shia National Police have had little trouble working alongside the Sunni SOS inside the city.

On the American side, cooperation has existed from the beginning. Unable to get support from the Iraqi government, the Samarra Sahwa movement’s six founders (two imams, two former Baath-party intelligence officers, one businessman, and one Saddam-era army colonel) — four of whom I met — eventually approached No Slack at their patrol base in the city. It was a risky proposition, but as they told me repeatedly, “from the beginning, the Americans were very serious about it.”

Initial meetings started in October of 2007, and quickly accelerated when they were synched with a parallel effort by U.S. Special Forces to facilitate the return of key leaders from Syria. Without No Slack’s initiative and Special Forces’ backroom handiwork, the movement would never have taken off. The Sahwa leaders were scared to face al-Qaeda, divided amongst themselves, and inherently skeptical of their former adversaries.

Negotiations continued in secret until mid-February, after which the SOS received four days of training at an American base and then were promptly dispatched to man checkpoints throughout the city. The first few weeks were tense, but al-Qaeda hadn’t seen it coming, and they were knocked off their feet. In the first 16 days of its existence, the SOS uncovered 19 massive weapons caches. The real power brokers had taken back their streets, and the Americans had their back. Almost immediately, attacks throughout Samarra died off, and today show no sign of resuscitation.

The movement’s founders admit that many — if not most — of their members are former insurgents. Yet they stress that most were never hardcore fighters, and their current participation in the SOS centers largely on the $250 they receive each month. Not a bad chunk of change in a city boasting a staggering unemployment rate. That said, the SRC seems to keep close tabs on their men, as I witness the council agree to expel 21 SOS members suspected of having continued al-Qaeda ties.

The events of March 28, 2008, provide the most glaring example I found that SRC leaders are not the shady back-stabbers our media has made them out to be. On this day, Am Muhamed and another former insurgent spent the afternoon briefing the entire No Slack officer corps. The topic: “Tactics of Samarra insurgents and how to defeat them.” The class included personal insights on how insurgents attack, how they escape, where they hide their weapons, amongst other tips. If only the guys could see this.

This is all great stuff, but will go for naught if Samarrans don’t abide. So how do the people feel? Everyone I spoke with reveres the SOS as “the heroes of Samarra.” One local shopkeeper summed it up thus, “With all due respect to the Coalition Forces, it was the Sahwa movement that brought the most security to the city. Today is the safest Samarra has been since al-Qaeda arrived in 2004.”

When I sat down two days ago to interview SRC leader Am Muhamed, he concluded the interview with a statement: “Please pass along a message to your government from me. Tell them to do everything they can to get my boys hired into the Iraqi Security Forces. If they don’t get hired, they will go back to being jobless . . . and we go back to the starting point.”

This is the future challenge of the SOS. Nearly all 2,200 want to join the ISF; and while General Rasheed al-Hilfi and other ISF leaders vow to do what they can to integrate them, the process will be slow, and will end in disappointment for many. On top of this, the Maliki government is suspicious of the program and the American military is hell-bent on reducing the “bridging mechanism” that is the SOS. The later point, however, we can control.

A general policy of reducing the “Sons of Iraq” rolls is correct, as they were never meant to be a permanent force. But some thought must be given to the security implications of radically reducing their numbers. To me, this arbitrary administrative “goal” smells eerily similar to the choreographed battle-space “handovers” many units hastily executed with Iraqi security units from 2004-2006, only to see the territory fall back into enemy hands.

Today, we have al-Qaeda five feet under, and yet could still snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. The SOS — and equivalent groups across Iraq — have transformed the entire war; and without them, Samarra, and all of Iraq, would not be where they are today — closer to self-sufficiency than they’ve ever been. Success, not speed, must remain our lodestar. And transferring Iraq’s Sons into the legitimate Iraqi Security Forces must be dictated by temperance, not administrative timelines.

— Captain Pete Hegseth of the Army National Guard served in Samarra, Iraq with the 101st Airborne from December 2005 to July 2006 and has returned there as an embedded correspondent for NRO as part of Vets for Freedom’s “Back to Iraq” effort.

U.S. helps Iraq’s air force fly again

The project is part of a broader plan to train Iraqi forces to take over when U.S. forces leave.

By Ernesto Londono
The Washington Post

Article Last Updated: 08/13/2008 08:30:56 PM MDT

KIRKUK, Iraq — Col. Abdul Karim Aziz, a fighter pilot who survived the war between Iraq and Iran during the 1980s, had all but given up hope of flying again when his mother told him in 2005 that it was time to get back in the air.

“When the war began, I didn’t think of coming back,” said Aziz, 49, speaking about the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Referring to the American military, he added: “I didn’t like the friendly side.”

The U.S. military all but paralyzed the Iraqi air force after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, turning veteran pilots such as Aziz into grounded bureaucrats. The little that remained of the country’s once-mighty fleet was obliterated during the early weeks of the Iraq war. And Iraq’s skies became the domain of the U.S. military, controlled from an operations center in Qatar.

Now in an about-face, the U.S. Air Force is spending hundreds of millions of dollars to get Aziz and others to fly again, train a fresh generation of pilots and build up the Iraqi air force’s fleet and infrastructure from scratch. The Air Force project is part of a broader effort to train and equip specialized units of Iraq’s security forces, which U.S. commanders see as a critical step to set the conditions for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

As violence has fallen in Iraq in recent months, these initiatives have become one of the U.S. military’s top priorities. But they are getting off the ground as Iraqis have stepped up calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and as U.S. lawmakers, who in recent years have allocated billions of dollars to train and equip Iraq’s security forces, are increasingly demanding that Iraqis pick up a greater share of the tab for security.

U.S. lawmakers appropriated $8.5 billion to train and equip Iraq’s security forces in 2007 and 2008. Of that sum, roughly $457 million went to the Iraqi air force.

Building an air force takes years, if not decades. And rebuilding Iraq’s has been a particularly challenging mission, U.S. officials say.

Though small, modest and devoid of firepower, the Iraqi air force has a solid foundation and has given Iraqis something to be proud of, U.S. officials say. Iraqis, accustomed to U.S. helicopters that hover over their cities round the clock, wave excitedly when they see aircraft with the Iraqi flag.

The Iraqi air force currently has 76 aircraft, most donated by the U.S. and other nations.

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The commander of multi-national forces in Iraq’s northern provinces reports significant progress in the battle against terrorists and insurgents, allowing the region to turn its attention to economic matters and other concerns. VOA’s Michael Bowman reports from Washington.

Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling, commander of the U.S. forces in northern Iraq, gestures as he speaks at a press conference in Baghdad (File)

Despite a recent wave of suicide attacks in Iraq, U.S. Major General Mark Hertling says he has never been more hopeful about the country’s future as he is right now.

“We have seen a sharp decline, not only in attacks, but [also] in foreign fighters traversing the western Ninawa deserts. And we have captured or killed dozens of mid and high-level [terrorist] operatives in the province and in the city of Mosul itself. With the Iraqi army, we have also disrupted the flow of foreign terrorists from Syria,” he said.

Hertling was speaking near Tikrit in a teleconference with reporters at the Pentagon.

The general says Iraqi army and police forces are growing in numbers and becoming more effective every day, contributing to a markedly-improved security situation in the country’s northern provinces. As a result, he says residents and local governments have been able to devote greater attention to infrastructure and employment needs.

Hertling stresses that the battle against terrorists and insurgents is far from won. He says many combatants have been forced from cities like Mosul and are now attempting to regroup in villages and rural areas. This trend has necessitated a new initiative, called Operation Iron Pursuit, to hunt down terrorists outside urban areas.

“It is a very hopeful time in Iraq, but there are still a lot of enemy [fighters] out there, and in order to get the people of Iraq completely secure, we have to continue to go after al-Qaida and the other extremists,” he added.

Hertling noted that Georgian troops serving in Iraq have been called home as a result of their country’s ongoing conflict with Russia. But the general expressed confidence that the departure of Georgian forces, which total 2,000 in Iraq, would not significantly weaken multi-national operations.